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“THE WRONG APPROACH AT THE WRONG TIME?”:  
MAINE ADOPTS STRICT LIABILITY FOR 
ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES IN DYER 
V. MAINE DRILLING AND BLASTING, INC. 
Matthew Cobb* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, held in 
Dyer v. Maine Drilling and Blasting, Inc.1 that strict liability should be applied to 
abnormally dangerous activities in accordance with the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §§ 519-20.2  In doing so, the court expressly overruled its decision in 
Reynolds v. W.H. Hinman Co.,3 which had rejected a strict liability approach to 
blasting cases in favor of a negligence-based standard.4 
In Dyer, a majority of the Law Court vacated the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment for Maine Drilling and Blasting, Inc. (Maine Drilling)5 and 
held that strict liability should be applied in cases that involve abnormally 
dangerous activities.6  The majority explained that policy approaches regarding 
strict liability had shifted in the more than fifty years since the court’s decision in 
Reynolds and that almost every other state now applied strict liability in abnormally 
dangerous activity cases.7  Furthermore, the majority maintained that because the 
                                                                                                     
 * J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Maine School of Law.  I would like to thank Professors 
Melvyn Zarr and Jennifer Wriggins for their invaluable observations and advice on this project and 
many others. 
 1. 2009 ME 126, 984 A.2d 210. 
 2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1977).  §§ 519-20 provide, in relevant part: 
§519.  General Principle 
 (1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability 
for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, 
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm. 
 (2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which 
makes the activity abnormally dangerous. 
 
§ 520.  Abnormally Dangerous Activities 
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors 
are to be considered: 
 (a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels 
of others; 
 (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
 (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
 (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 
 (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and 
 (f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous 
attributes.  
 3. 145 Me. 343, 75 A.2d 802 (1950).  
 4. Id. at 361, 75 A.2d at 811. 
 5. Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 37, 984 A.2d at 220.  
 6. Id. ¶ 18, 984 A.2d at 216. 
 7. Id. 
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legal basis upon which Reynolds was decided had “fallen into jurisprudential 
disrepute . . . [the court] must allow that rule to change.”8  The dissents, however, 
contended that there was no need to adopt a strict liability standard because it was 
very likely the Dyers could recover damages by showing causation under 
Reynolds’s negligence standard9 and, therefore, principles of stare decisis weighed 
against needlessly overturning viable precedent.10 
Although “blasting [is regarded] as a paradigm of the abnormally dangerous 
activities category” under the theory of strict liability,11 the dissents were correct 
that there was no need to overturn Reynolds because it was very likely that the 
Dyers could have recovered under the negligence standard established by that 
decision.  Moreover, as many courts and commentators have argued, strict liability 
should only be applied in an abnormally dangerous activities case when the 
plaintiff has demonstrated that proving negligence would be impossible.12 
Part II of this Note will examine the Law Court’s prior opinions in blasting 
cases and Part III will analyze the Dyer decision.  Part IV will then demonstrate 
that the dissents properly brought into question the rationales the majority utilized 
as justifications for imposing strict liability.  Part IV will also examine how section 
520 should be applied in future cases and will argue that whether strict liability 
should be imposed on a given activity is a decision best left to the discretion of the 
Legislature.  This Note will conclude by maintaining that the scope of common law 
strict liability in Maine should remain limited.   
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF BLASTING CASES IN MAINE 
In the 1950 case of Reynolds, the Law Court declined to impose strict liability 
on blasting activities in favor of a negligence-based standard of care.13  In that case, 
the plaintiffs alleged that their home had been damaged by seismic vibrations from 
W.H. Hinman’s blasting operations during a public construction project along 
Route 1 in Bath, Maine.14  The court found that it was unnecessary to adopt strict 
liability “in order to do justice to a plaintiff” because if “proper emphasis is laid on 
the test of due care according to the circumstances, then the theory of negligence 
will generally be sufficient” to allow the plaintiff to recover for injuries incurred 
from blasting.15  The court also noted that there were “no unanimously approved 
rules or criteria” that could be employed to distinguish between dangers that 
require ordinary care and those that are deemed extra hazardous.16  Even so, the 
court reasoned that juries, when presented with the question, would usually find 
that the degree of care “will increase in proportion to the danger to be apprehended 
                                                                                                     
 8. Id. ¶ 28, 984 A.2d at 218 (citations omitted). 
 9. Id. ¶ 41, 984 A.2d at 221 (Alexander, J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. ¶¶ 45-47, 984 A.2d at 222. 
 11. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Restatement (Third) of Torts and Traditional Strict Liability: 
Robust Rationales, Slender Doctrines, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1355, 1364 (2009). 
 12. See Gerald W. Boston, Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activity: The Negligence 
Barrier, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 597, 631-40 (1999). 
 13. Reynolds, 145 Me. at 361, 75 A.2d at 811. 
 14. Id. at 343, 75 A.2d at 802-03. 
 15. Id. at 351, 75 A.2d at 806 (citation omitted). 
 16. Id. at 349, 75 A.2d at 805 (citations omitted). 
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in case of neglect,” and that accordingly “the amount of care required of a blaster” 
will be very high. 17  Five years later, the Law Court applied this negligence 
standard in two blasting cases: Albison v. Robbins and White, Inc.18 and Cratty v. 
Samuel Aceto and Co.19   
In Albison, a group of homeowners claimed that their properties had been 
damaged by the defendant’s blasting of ledge for a sewage tunnel as part of a 
general contract with the city of Waterville.20  The homeowners alleged that 
Robbins and White’s superintendent had been informed that vibrations from the 
blasts were causing severe damage to their property and that he had responded by 
stating he was using the smallest charges of dynamite possible, even though he 
never attempted to determine if he could remove the ledge effectively with a lesser 
charge.21  Thereafter, he continued to use the same methods and the same amount 
of dynamite as before, causing further damage to the homeowners’ properties.22  
The court, citing its decision in Reynolds, explained that “ordinary care depends on 
the circumstances of each particular case.  Where the risk is great a person must be 
especially cautious.”23  Accordingly, the court found that the “defendant was 
indifferent to probable consequences, which is the highest form of negligence” and 
that “a slower method with more moderate charges of the explosive, would (if it 
had been tried) have caused little or no damage.”24  The court reaffirmed that 
“[t]here is no absolute liability for damage by blasting.  There is liability for 
damage which takes place from blasting carried on in a negligent manner.”  Two 
days later, the court further developed this negligence standard with its decision in 
Cratty.  
Similar to the facts in Albison, the plaintiff in Cratty claimed that his home’s 
foundation had been cracked by shockwaves from the defendant’s blasting, which 
had taken place within 200 feet of his house, in connection with the laying of a 
sewer line for the Waterville Sewage District.25  However, unlike in Albison, Cratty 
could not establish either the amount of dynamite being used or the methods 
employed by Samuel Aceto and Co., or that the blasters had any knowledge of the 
property damage they had allegedly caused.26  Despite this lack of evidence, the 
Law Court found that to establish negligence in a blasting case “[i]t may not be 
necessary for a plaintiff to show . . . evidence as to the amount of explosive being 
used or the method or manner of its use” and that negligence may be proven “by 
any evidence that is relevant and material, although it may be circumstantial.”27  
The court further explained that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could be employed 
by a plaintiff in situations “where the circumstances are, as here, most uncommon, 
unusual, unexpected and extraordinary, and the damage is such that it would not 
                                                                                                     
 17. Id. at 351, 75 A.2d at 806 (citation omitted). 
 18. 151 Me. 114, 116 A.2d 608 (1955). 
 19. 151 Me. 126, 116 A.2d 623 (1955). 
 20. Albison, 151 Me. at 117, 116 A.2d at 610.  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 122, 116 A.2d at 612. 
 24. Id. at 125, 116 A.2d at 613. 
 25. Cratty, 151 Me. at 126, 116 A.2d at 624-25. 
 26. Id. at 128, 116 A.2d at 625. 
 27. Id. at 131, 116 A.2d at 626 (internal quotations omitted). 
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ordinarily have occurred if the user of the dangerous instrumentality had the 
required knowledge, and proper care had been exercised in its use.”28   
The court, in crafting its opinion, maintained that it is “rare that damage is 
caused to adjoining property[] if the blaster uses the reasonable care that the law 
requires that he should use.  This is common knowledge to every school boy and to 
every adult citizen.”29  This negligence-based approach, established in Reynolds 
and expanded upon in Albison and Cratty, remained firmly fixed in Maine law over 
the next fifty years and was still being applied as recently as the 2007 case of 
Maravell v. R.J. Grondin and Sons.30 
In Maravell, the plaintiff claimed that she had sustained hearing damage from 
blasts conducted as close as eighty-five feet from her office during the construction 
of a shopping mall.31  She contended that Grondin, the general contractor, had 
“negligently failed to exercise reasonable care in ‘implementing, contracting for, 
and overseeing’ the blasting.”32  The Law Court, citing Albison and Cratty, noted 
that “the standard of care of a blasting contractor may lie within common 
knowledge,”33 but went on to explain that because “a layperson could not say 
precisely what provisions a general contractor is required to make for the taking of 
precautions[,] [e]xpert testimony is, therefore, necessary to establish the duty of a 
general contractor.”34 
A report produced by Maravell’s expert witness concluded that the 
subcontractor could have better controlled the ground vibrations, air blasts, and 
noise from the blasting “by, among other things, decreasing the hole depth and 
diameter; reducing the number of holes per blast and pounds per delay; providing 
ear protection; and constructing artificial noise barriers.”35  The court concluded 
that a “fact-finder could reasonably infer that Grondin was required to exercise 
reasonable care to ensure” that the subcontractor took the precautions mentioned in 
the report.36   
The court also dealt with the issue of whether W/S Biddeford Properties, LLC 
could be held liable as the owner of the property upon which the blasting took 
place.37  After explaining that a landowner can be held liable for the activity of a 
third party that takes place on the landowner’s property if they are aware that the 
activity will cause harm and the landowner fails to exercise reasonable care to 
prevent the injury,38 the court found: 
Here blasting, an inherently dangerous activity, was being conducted within 
eighty-five feet of Maravell’s office, apparently with no sight, sound, or blast 
                                                                                                     
 28. Id. at 133, 116 A.2d at 627. 
 29. Id. at 131, 116 A.2d at 627. 
 30. 2007 ME 1, 914 A.2d 709. 
 31. Id. ¶ 2, 914 A.2d at 711. 
 32. Id. ¶ 3, 914 A.2d at 711.  Maravell also commenced actions against McGoldrick Brothers 
Blasting Services, Inc, which was subsequently settled, and against the shopping mall’s property 
owners, W/S Biddeford Properties, LLC, who were made parties to this appeal.  Id.  
 33. Id. ¶ 12, 914 A.2d at 713. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. ¶ 13, 914 A.2d at 713. 
 36. Maravell, 2007 ME 1, ¶ 13, 914 A.2d at 711. 
 37. Id. ¶ 16, 914 A.2d at 714. 
 38. Id. 
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barrier in between.  Because W/S Biddeford’s knowledge of that risk may be 
imputed, the only issue in dispute is whether the risk was unreasonable.  The 
record, as it presently stands, does not permit the court to conclude, as a matter of 
law, that there is no dispute as to material fact that the risks of injury from blasting 
eighty-five feet from Maravell’s office were not unreasonable.  As there remain 
disputes as to this material fact regarding W/S Biddeford’s liability, the summary 
judgment in their favor must be vacated.39 
Despite the fact that the Law Court had consistently applied the negligence 
standard to blasting cases for over fifty years, just three years after the Maravell 
decision the court rejected that standard with its opinion in Dyer, overruling 
Reynolds and its progeny in favor of a strict liability approach to abnormally 
dangerous activities.40 
III.  THE DYER DECISION 
A.  Factual Background and Procedural History 
Vera Dyer’s home in Prospect, Maine is thought to be over seventy-years-old 
and has a cement floor and foundation.41  In the fall of 2004, Maine Drilling gave 
Ms. Dyer notice that it would be blasting rock near her home as part of a 
construction project in connection with the replacement of the Waldo-Hancock 
County Bridge.42  Maine Drilling conducted a pre-blast survey of the Dyer home 
and the surveyor noted concrete deterioration in one of the walls and cracking of 
the concrete flooring.43  Ms. Dyer’s son, Richard Dyer, also documented the 
condition of the home by videotape prior to the blasting.44  Subsequently, Maine 
Drilling “conducted over 100 blasts between October 2004 and early August 2005.  
The closest blast was approximately 100 feet from the Dyer home.”45  Although 
Ms. Dyer was visiting Florida when most of the blasting took place, she was in the 
home when two of the blasts were set off and she felt the entire house shake.46  In 
the spring of 2005, after the blasting had begun, Ms. Dyer’s sons, Paul and 
Richard, checked on the house and noticed several changes in the condition of the 
home, including: a three inch drop in the center of the basement floor; new and 
enlarged cracks in the foundation; and a sagging support beam that caused the first 
floor to be noticeably unlevel.47  According to a seismograph placed adjacent to the 
Dyer home, at least six of the blasts exceeded guidelines set by United States 
Bureau of Mines (USBM), which are intended to create a “safe operating 
                                                                                                     
 39. Id. ¶ 17, 914 A.2d at 714. 
 40. Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 15, 984 A.2d at 215. 
 41. Id. ¶ 3, 984 A.2d at 212. 
 42. Id. ¶ 4, 984 A.2d at 212-13.  The Dyer family has already endured a great deal of hardship 
related to the replacement of the Waldo-Hancock County Bridge: the restaurant that the family had 
owned and operated for over fifty years along Route 1 in Prospect was seized by the Maine Department 
of Transportation pursuant to that agency’s eminent domain powers and was subsequently demolished.  
See Dyer v. Dep’t of Transp., 2008 ME 106, 951 A.2d 821. 
 43. Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 5, 984 A.2d at 213. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. ¶ 6, 984 A.2d at 213. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. ¶ 7, 984 A.2d at 213. 
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envelope” in order to minimize property damage from seismic vibrations.48  Mark 
Peterson, an expert in ground engineering consulted by the Dyers, testified at a 
deposition that blasts conducted within the “safe operating envelope” were unlikely 
to cause damage to structures within a building, but also opined that if the building 
was underlain with uncontrolled fill, as opposed to engineered fill,49 the home 
could potentially have been damaged even if the blasts were within the established 
guidelines.50   
The Dyers filed a complaint against Maine Drilling that included causes of 
action based on negligence and strict liability.51  Maine Drilling subsequently filed 
a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.52  On the issue of 
strict liability, the trial court observed that in several decisions “the Law Court has 
expressly held that blasting activities do not expose the actor to strict liability” and 
that even though the Dyers argue those rulings are obsolete, “that caselaw remains 
binding authority that controls this court’s formulation of the law.”53  With respect 
to the Dyers’ negligence claim, the trial court found that the USBM guidelines 
were sufficient as a basis for identifying a standard of care and that the “record 
includes evidence that six of the blasts that Maine Drilling conducted exceeded 
[those] guidelines.”54  However, the trial court found that there was no triable issue 
regarding causation, reasoning that because there was no evidence as to the actual 
nature of the fill under the house, Peterson could only speculate as to how blasting 
would affect the home in relation to the fill.55  The trial court also maintained that 
summary judgment for Maine Drilling was warranted because “the record does not 
include an expert opinion that the blasting conducted by Maine Drilling was a legal 
cause of cracking in the house.”56  Shortly thereafter, the Dyers filed an appeal to 
the Law Court. 
B.  Arguments to the Law Court 
On appeal, the Dyers argued that the Law Court should overrule the Reynolds 
line of cases and “hold that actors who conduct abnormally dangerous activities, 
like Defendant’s blasting in this case, are subject to strict liability.”57  The Dyers 
observed that even though the issue of strict liability was not raised in Maravell, 
the court had characterized blasting in that case as “an inherently dangerous 
                                                                                                     
 48. Id. ¶¶ 9-10, 984 A.2d at 213-14. 
 49. “According to Peterson, engineered fill refers to subgrade under a structure’s foundation that is 
layered, compacted, or placed in a way so as ‘to avoid deformation after it was placed[,]’” whereas 
uncontrolled fill “is ‘fill that’s from an unknown source and of unknown characteristic and placed in an 
unknown way.’”  Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 9 n.2, 984 A.2d at 213 (citation to footnote only).  
 50. Id. ¶ 9, 984 A.2d at 213. 
 51. Id. ¶ 12, 984 A.2d at 214. 
 52. Id. ¶ 13, 984 A.2d at 214. 
 53. Dyer v. Me. Drilling and Blasting, Inc., No. CV-07-11, 2009 WL 558278 (Me. Super. Feb. 3, 
2009). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Brief of Appellants at 6, Dyer v. Me. Drilling and Blasting, Inc., 2009 ME 126, 984 A.2d 210 
(No. WAL-09-116) [hereinafter Brief of Appellants].  
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activity.”58  Accordingly, they argued that “Maine law relative to the application of 
strict liability to blasting is antiquated and obsolete” and that the court “should join 
the vast majority of jurisdictions who have adopted the Restatement view relative 
to blasting.”59 
Additionally, the Dyers contended that the trial court committed legal error 
when it found there was no triable issue as to causation.60  They argued that the 
court had failed to consider the six blasts that exceeded the USBM guidelines; an 
error that was particularly significant given that the court had focused on those 
guidelines as a basis for identifying a standard of care.61  The Dyers also 
emphasized that they had observed noticeable changes in the condition of the home 
after the blasting took place, and that under Maine law expert testimony was not 
required to establish legal causation in a blasting case.62 
In response, Maine Drilling asserted that the trial court was correct in holding 
that the Reynolds, Cratty, and Albison line of cases were controlling and that strict 
liability did not apply to blasting under Maine law.63  Maine Drilling acknowledged 
that the Maravell court had characterized blasting as “inherently dangerous,” but 
argued that precautionary steps and safety procedures could be employed to 
“substantially eliminate the danger,” whereas similar measures could not be 
utilized to eliminate the risk of more serious harms arising from abnormally 
dangerous activities.64  Moreover, Maine Drilling claimed that pursuant to the 
principle of stare decisis, the court should only depart from established precedent 
under “the most extraordinary circumstances” and that the Dyers had not pointed to 
any “changed conditions so as to justify a departure” from the negligence 
standard.65   
Furthermore, Maine Drilling contended that the grant of summary judgment on 
the issue of causation had been proper because Peterson “admitted the cause of the 
alleged damages are ‘unknown,’ ‘speculative,’ and he had no opinion as to 
causation.”66  Maine Drilling also maintained that the Dyers did not establish a time 
relationship between the blasting and the discovery of the alleged damage to the 
home and that prior to the blasting, the Dyer home “had cracks in the floor and 
protruding from the chimney.”67  
C.  Decision of the Law Court 
Justice Silver, writing for a majority of the Law Court, adopted the Second 
Restatement’s application of strict liability to abnormally dangerous activities and 
                                                                                                     
 58. Id. at 7 (citation omitted). 
 59. Id. at 8. 
 60. Id. at 10. 
 61. Id. at 12. 
 62. Id. at 17-18. 
 63. Brief of Appellee at 8, Dyer v. Me. Drilling and Blasting, Inc., 2009 ME 126, 984 A.2d 210 
(No. WAL-09-116) [hereinafter Brief of Appellee]. 
 64. Id. at 11. 
 65. Id. at 13 (citation omitted). 
 66. Id. at 18 (citation omitted). 
 67. Id. at 2.   
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expressly overruled Reynolds and its progeny.68  The court then remanded the case 
to the trial court “to determine if the blasting . . . was an abnormally dangerous 
activity under the Restatement’s six-factor test.”69  The court explained that the 
rationales for not adopting strict liability in Reynolds had been undermined in the 
last half-century, particularly by a nationwide shift in policy approaches that had 
lead “almost every other state to adopt strict liability in blasting and abnormally 
dangerous activity cases.”70  Moreover, the court noted that blasting is “inherently 
dangerous” and argued that “most courts have recognized that this inherent danger 
cannot be eliminated by the exercise of care.”71  In support of this assertion, the 
court demonstrated that “[t]he Dyers’ expert testified that blasting may cause 
damage even when it is within the [USBM] guidelines.”72  The court further 
justified imposing strict liability by contending that “although blasting is a lawful 
and often beneficial activity, the costs should fall on those who benefit from the 
blasting, rather than on an unfortunate neighbor.”73  The court reasoned that 
because blasters are required to carry liability insurance by many town ordinances 
and by the rules of the Maine Department of Public Safety, “a strict liability 
scheme should not greatly increase costs for these businesses.”74  
On the issue of causation, the court found that the Dyers had produced 
sufficient evidence to defeat Maine Drilling’s summary judgment motion.75  The 
majority pointed out that six of the blasts had exceeded the USBM guidelines and 
concluded that a fact-finder could infer that the changes observed by the Dyers 
“over a short period of time[,] in a home over seventy-years-old, were not likely to 
be caused” by natural processes.76  The court also explained that Cratty had held 
expert testimony was not required “to prove negligence, including causation, in a 
blasting case.”77   
D.  The Dissents 
Justice Alexander, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Saufley, argued that 
there was no need to overrule Reynolds and establish a new common law rule of 
strict liability in blasting cases because the Dyers could recover damages by 
showing causation under the existing negligence standard.78  The dissent noted that 
“[s]tare decisis helps to assure that an appellate judge’s view that a prior decision 
may have been wrongly decided is, standing alone, insufficient to justify overruling 
the decision.”79  Furthermore, the dissent maintained that adherence to viable 
precedent provides consistency in the law and that past decisions should only be 
                                                                                                     
 68. Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 15, 984 A.2d at 215. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. ¶ 18, 984 A.2d at 216. 
 71. Id. ¶ 19, 984 A.2d at 216. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 20, 984 A.2d at 216. 
 75. Id. ¶ 33, 984 A.2d at 219-20. 
 76. Id. ¶¶ 34-35, 984 A.2d at 220. 
 77. Id. ¶ 35, 984 A.2d at 220 (citation omitted). 
 78. Id. ¶ 41, 984 A.2d at 221 (Alexander, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. ¶ 46, 984 A.2d at 222 (citing Alexandre v. State, 2007 ME 106, ¶ 35, 927 A.2d 1155, 1164). 
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overruled “after careful analysis and based on a compelling reason.”80  In 
demonstrating that there was no need to supplant Maine’s negligence standard with 
a strict liability approach to blasting cases, Justice Alexander explained: 
Here the trial court has already determined that there is sufficient evidence to 
avoid summary judgment on the standard of care and breach of the standard of 
care issues.  Thus, the only dispute for resolution on this appeal is whether there 
remain disputed facts relating to the issue of causation.  The Court holds, and I 
agree, that the Dyers have produced sufficient evidence to survive Maine 
Drilling’s motion for summary judgment on the causation issue incident to their 
negligence claim.  Thus, based on the Court’s reasoning, and with the trial court 
having found fact disputes regarding the standard of care and breach of the 
standard of care, the Dyers’ negligence claim may proceed to trial.81  
The dissent also recognized that Cratty was factually on point with the Dyers’ 
situation and that it provided proper guidance on the issues of negligence and 
causation in blasting cases.  As a result, Justice Alexander concluded by stating that 
the court “should leave resolution of this claim to the trial court, based on our 
existing body of law,”82 and furthermore, “should leave it to the Legislature, as a 
matter of policy, to determine whether or not to adopt an expanded rule of strict 
liability for all cases of damage caused by blasting.”83  
Chief Justice Saufley also issued a dissent and initially observed that under 
strict liability financial damages are imposed without any proof of fault or 
wrongdoing.84  Recognizing that for the last half-century Maine businesses and 
insurers have had the expectancy that blasters will only be held liable for their 
negligence, the dissent maintained that the majority’s “expansion of fiscal 
responsibility to cases where there has been no wrongdoing changes a long-
established financial business equation.”85  The dissent also criticized the majority 
for expanding liability “without any factual demonstration of the need for such 
change or the potential effect on Maine’s economy”86 and concluded by stating that 
“[a]s a matter of jurisprudential policy, this is the wrong approach at the wrong 
time.”87 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Questionable Rationales 
The majority invoked two familiar rationales for imposing strict liability in 
Dyer: (1) that the risk of harm from blasting could not be eliminated by the 
exercise of reasonable care;88 and (2) that the economic loss should fall on the party 
                                                                                                     
 80. Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶¶ 45-46, 984 A.2d at 222. 
 81. Id. ¶ 49, 984 A.2d at 222 (Alexander, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 82. Id. ¶ 54, 984 A.2d at 224. 
 83. Id. ¶ 53, 984 A.2d at 224. 
 84. Id. ¶ 56, 984 A.2d at 224 (Saufley, C.J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 57, 984 A.2d at 224. 
 87. Id. ¶ 58, 984 A.2d at 224. 
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benefiting from the dangerous activity.89  Justice Alexander’s dissent demonstrated 
that the first rationale could not be used to justify strict liability based on the facts 
presented in Dyer90 and Chief Justice Saufley’s dissent questioned the wisdom of 
imposing strict liability’s cost-spreading scheme on Maine businesses.91 
1.  Maine’s Negligence Standard Was Viable and Equitable in Dyer   
The majority explained that most courts have found that the danger inherent in 
blasting “cannot be eliminated by the exercise of care” and then reasoned that strict 
liability should be applied in this case because “[t]he Dyers’ expert testified that 
blasting may cause damage even when it is within the [USBM] guidelines.”92  
However, Justice Alexander’s dissent convincingly maintained that there was no 
need to impose strict liability in this case because the Dyers could recover under 
Maine’s negligence standard.  As the dissent pointed out, the facts in Dyer were 
very similar to those presented in Cratty, where the plaintiff noticed cracking in his 
basement floor after blasting took place within 200 feet of his home.93  The Law 
Court held in Cratty that a lack of evidence regarding the amount of explosives 
used or the blasting methods employed by the defendant did not prevent Cratty’s 
claim from proceeding to trial because negligence could be proven “by any 
evidence that is relevant and material, although it may be circumstantial.”94  The 
dissent observed that in this case, the blasting occurred within 100 feet of the 
Dyers’ home and that, unlike in Cratty, a potential standard of care existed in the 
form of the USBM guidelines with evidence that that standard was breached on at 
least six occasions.95 
Despite the fact that the majority disagreed with the trial court and found that 
the Dyers had produced evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment on the 
issue of causation,96 the majority reached out to address the strict liability issue 
even though the case could have simply been remanded back to the trial court for 
further exploration of the negligence claim.  Although the majority argued it could 
address the strict liability issue,97 it never articulated why it was necessary to 
address that issue in this case.  The trial court’s analysis of the negligence claim 
ended when it determined that there was no triable issue as to causation.98  As a 
result, the majority’s analysis should have ended when it found that the Dyers had 
indeed produced evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment on that issue.99      
Furthermore, in ruling on Maine Drilling’s motion for summary judgment, the 
trial court found that “if this is a case where the Dyers would be required to present 
evidence of a standard of care, the evidence includes a basis on which the Dyers 
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can argue that Maine Drilling breached the applicable standard and duty of 
care.”100  This demonstrates that the applicable standard of care issue was still in 
question, but that the evidence in the record would be sufficient to survive a motion 
for summary judgment on that issue.  Thus, the USBM guidelines only served as a 
potential standard of care against which Maine Drilling’s actions could be 
measured.  Despite this reality, the majority proceeded to justify the adoption of a 
“no fault” rule of liability based on one expert’s speculation that this potential 
standard of care may be inadequate under a particular set of circumstances to 
prevent some unspecified type of damage.  Interestingly, in finding that there was a 
triable issue as to causation, the majority pointed to the six blasts that exceeded the 
USBM guidelines as evidence that would allow a fact-finder to infer that Maine 
Drilling had caused damage to the home.101  This position seems to be inconsistent: 
denying that the risk of harm can be eliminated with the exercise of due care and 
than finding that damage occurred because due care was not properly exercised.   
2.  Was the Cost-Spreading Approach Justifiable or Prudent? 
Cost-spreading can be viewed as an economic rationale or as a fairness 
rationale.102  As the majority explained, “strict liability seeks to encourage . . . cost-
spreading”103 and that “although blasting is a lawful and often beneficial activity, 
the costs should fall on those who benefit from the blasting, rather than on an 
unfortunate neighbor.”104  Even so, given the fact that it was very likely the Dyers 
could recover under a negligence theory on remand, the majority failed to explain 
how the “costs” of Maine Drillings’ blasting activities were likely to fall on the 
“unfortunate” Dyers in this case.  The majority further reasoned that because 
blasters are required to carry liability insurance in many circumstances, “a strict 
liability scheme should not greatly increase costs for these businesses.”105  
However, no empirical evidence was ever provided in the opinion to support this 
assumption; nor did the majority seem to be troubled by the fact that cost-spreading 
has increasingly drawn criticism as being “open-ended” and “highly expansive” in 
its allocation of tort liability.106 
Accordingly, Chief Justice Saufley was correct to be concerned in her dissent 
that the majority had “exercised its authority to expand liability without any factual 
demonstration of the need for such change or the potential effect on Maine’s 
economy.”107  In fact, several issues that were never addressed by the majority are 
raised in the Restatement (Third) of Torts’s rejection of the cost-spreading rationale 
as a justification for applying strict liability to abnormally dangerous activities:   
The appeal of strict liability . . . does not depend on any notion that the defendant 
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is in a better position than the plaintiff to allocate or distribute the risk of harm:  
indeed, the defendant may be a small business enterprise; the property damage 
suffered by the plaintiff may be no more than moderate, and the plaintiff as a 
property owner may already be insured for the loss that that damage entails.108 
Moreover, Chief Justice Saufley drew attention to the fact that the majority’s 
shift in policy from holding blasters liable when they are negligent, or at fault, to 
“[t]he expansion of fiscal responsibility to cases where there has been no 
wrongdoing changes a long-established financial business equation” because for 
over half-a-century “it has been the settled expectation of [Maine] businesses and 
insurers that blasters . . . will be held responsible if they are negligent.”109  
Although the majority maintained that it is the proper role of the court to 
continually shape and define the scope of liability for blasters,110 the Law Court has 
previously held and reaffirmed the principle that long-established policy 
approaches should only be changed “when [the policy] operates erratically and 
produces undesirable results in frequently recurring kinds of situations.”111  Given 
the fact that in Reynolds, Albison, Cratty, Maravell, and, as argued above, Dyer, the 
plaintiffs’ cases were able to proceed past summary judgment under Maine’s 
negligence standard, the majority failed to demonstrate how the existing liability 
standards in blasting cases had been operating “erratically” or how they had been 
producing “undesirable results.”  Thus, even though the majority articulated a 
familiar rationale for imposing strict liability on blasting, it failed to provide a 
compelling reason for why it was necessary to address the strict liability issue in 
Dyer.  Above all, the issues raised by the dissents are of particular relevance now 
that the Law Court has opened the door to future litigation concerning what 
activities should be considered abnormally dangerous under Maine law.   
B.  The Application of Section 520’s Six-Factor Test to Future Cases 
The Law Court’s holding in Dyer did not expressly impose strict liability on 
blasting: “We adopt today the Second Restatement’s imposition of strict liability 
for abnormally dangerous activities, and remand to the court to determine if the 
blasting in this case was an abnormally dangerous activity under the Restatement’s 
six-factor test.”112  Given this pronouncement, strict liability can now be applied to 
any situation where a court finds that an activity meets the Restatement’s six-factor 
test.  Inevitably, the Law Court will be compelled in future cases to decide whether 
a given activity is abnormally dangerous and therefore warrants the application of 
strict liability under the Second Restatement.  In doing so, the court should 
recognize that that issue should be determined as a matter of law.  The court should 
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also be aware that most courts have found that factor (c)—whether the risk of harm 
can be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care—controls the legal analysis 
and the legal conclusion in cases applying section 520’s six-factor test.113  
1.  Whether an Activity is an Abnormally Dangerous One is a Question of Law 
After adopting strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, the Dyer 
court remanded the case to the trial court “to determine if blasting in this case was 
an abnormally dangerous activity under the Restatement’s six-factor test.”114  
However, the court did not clearly state whether the trial court should make this 
determination as a matter of law or whether resolution of the issue should be left to 
the jury.115  Comment L to section 520 of the Second Restatement directs courts to 
decide this issue as a matter of law and explains how the determination of this issue 
differs from questions arising under a negligence standard: 
The standard of the hypothetical reasonable man is essentially a jury standard, in 
which the court interferes only in the clearest cases. A jury is fully competent to 
decide whether the defendant has properly driven his horse or operated his train or 
guarded his machinery or repaired his premises, or dug a hole. The imposition of 
strict liability, on the other hand, involves a characterization of the defendant's 
activity or enterprise itself, and a decision as to whether he is free to conduct it at 
all without becoming subject to liability for the harm that ensues even though he 
has used all reasonable care. This calls for a decision of the court; and it is no part 
of the province of the jury to decide whether an industrial enterprise upon which 
the community's prosperity might depend is located in the wrong place or whether 
such an activity as blasting is to be permitted without liability in the center of a 
large city.116 
As the comment demonstrates, the reasonable person standard is used in 
negligence cases to determine whether a defendant’s actions fall within acceptable 
community norms of conduct.  Alternatively, the decision to apply strict liability to 
certain activities is a policy determination best left to a court’s discretion rather 
than a jury’s.  A number of appellate courts have embraced this position and have 
held that whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, and therefore warrants the 
imposition of strict liability, is an issue that should be decided as a matter of law.117    
2.  The Six-Factor Test Ultimately Asks Whether the Situation Can be  
Resolved Under a Negligence Standard 
In applying the Second Restatement’s six-factor test to determine if an activity 
is abnormally dangerous, a number of courts have found that the “crux of the 
liability issue” turns on whether the risk of harm can be eliminated by the exercise 
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of due care.118  For example, in Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad v. American 
Cyanamid Co.,119 Judge Richard Posner explained that “[t]he baseline common law 
regime of tort liability is negligence”120 and that when “the hazards of an activity 
can be avoided by being careful (which is to say, nonnegligent), there is no need to 
switch to strict liability.”121  In that case, Cyanamid, a manufacturer of the 
hazardous chemical acrylonitrile, had been held strictly liable by the trial court 
when a railroad tank car containing 20,000 gallons of the chemical spilled.122  In 
reversing the trial court’s holding that shipping acrylonitrile through a metropolitan 
area was an abnormally dangerous activity under section 520, Judge Posner noted 
that the court had “been given no reason . . . for believing that a negligence regime 
is not perfectly adequate to remedy and deter, at reasonable cost, the accidental 
spillage of acrylonitrile from rail cars.”123  He went on to conclude that based on all 
the available information “if a tank car is carefully maintained the danger of a spill 
of acrylonitrile is negligible.  If this is right, there is no compelling reason to move 
to a regime of strict liability.”124 
Similarly, in Bagley v. Controlled Environmental Corp.,125 former United 
States Supreme Court Justice David Souter, writing for the majority as a member of 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court, explained that the court would “decline to 
impose strict liability in the absence of any demonstration that the requirement to 
prove legal fault acts as a practical barrier to otherwise meritorious claims.”126  In 
that case, it was argued that Environmental Corp. should be held strictly liable 
under section 520 for the contamination of the plaintiff’s soil and ground water, 
which had been caused by the release of gasoline and waste materials into a 
neighboring property.127  The court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the strict 
liability claim and observed that “[w]ith respect to the dumping of the waste 
products and the leakage of gasoline in this case, there is no apparent impossibility 
of proving negligence.”128  In support of this position, he noted that “the facts 
pleaded in this case present no problems of identifying the person who may have 
breached a duty, or of tracing causation for harm to one among several defendants, 
each of whom breached a duty.”129   
This reluctance to abandon the negligence standard may also be attributable, in 
part, to the reality that legislatures, rather than appellate courts, are in a better 
position to gather information on certain dangerous activities and to weigh policy 
arguments both for and against the imposition of strict liability on those 
activities.130   
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C.  Strict Liability Issues Are More Readily Addressed by the Legislature 
Increasingly, the Maine Legislature has taken on the role of applying strict 
liability, as a matter of policy, in a number of instances, including natural gas 
explosions,131 injuries from defective products,132 and for hazardous waste and oil 
spills.133  Prior to the Law Court’s decision in Dyer the application of common law 
strict liability in Maine had been limited to damages caused by wild animals134 and 
owners of domestic animals in certain situations.135  Although blasting is regarded 
as a “paradigm of the abnormally dangerous activities category” under the theory 
of strict liability,136 the Law Court may find it much more difficult in future cases 
to apply the Restatement’s six-factor test to other activities.  As Professor Gerald 
Boston noted in his study of cases where section 520 was applied, courts have been 
forced to rely on “extra-judicial data . . . in arriving at the ultimate legal 
conclusion”137 because, for example, “[t]he decision of whether an activity is a 
matter of common usage or whether it is being conducted at a suitable place turns 
not so much on adjudicative facts, but more on legislative or policy judgments.”138  
Professor Boston went on to explain that this is why “one court can conclude that 
blasting is locationally suitable in one case, while most courts historically have 
found otherwise.”139  In order to avoid similarly erratic results, the Law Court 
should adhere to Justice Alexander’s admonition that “[the court] should leave it to 
the Legislature, as a matter of policy, to determine whether or not to adopt an 
expanded rule of strict liability.”140  The Law Court should also recognize that the 
Legislature is in a far better position to assess the financial and economic impacts 
of strict liability schemes on Maine businesses and insurers. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Dyer, the Law Court adopted the Second Restatement’s application of strict 
liability to activities that are found to be abnormally dangerous.141  The majority 
justified this decision by asserting that the risk of harm from blasting cannot be 
eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care142 and that notions of fairness 
associated with cost-spreading also served as justifications for imposing strict 
liability on blasters.143  However, Justice Alexander’s dissent convincingly 
maintained that because there was sufficient evidence in the record for the Dyers to 
recover under a negligence theory, there was no need to impose strict liability,144 
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and Chief Justice Saufley’s dissent provided valid criticism of the majority’s 
expansion of liability to cases where blasters have not engaged in any wrongdoing 
without providing a compelling reason for doing so.145   
Only a small number of activities have been found to be abnormally dangerous 
and deserving of strict liability under the Second Restatement.146  The Law Court, 
in future cases, should continue this narrow application of strict liability.  This can 
be achieved in large part by heeding the concerns voiced by the dissents in Dyer 
and by continuing to adhere to the principle that settled points of law will not be 
disturbed “unless ‘the prevailing precedent lacks vitality and the capacity to serve 
the interests of justice.’”147 
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